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. The answer to this dilemma is far from obvious. Even though the crimes of the past may call for retribution, the government must abide by the requirements of the rule of law and balance the implementation of such measures against the risks of political destabilisation. This unique set of issues, discussed since the early 90's under the name of transitional justice, has been present in the postauthoritarian countries of the Southern Cone, in the post-conflict settings of internal and international armed struggle and in the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe.
For more than forty years the communist regimes of the former Eastern bloc abused civil liberties, suppressed opposition and, when ordinary violence failed, resorted to extraordinary measures such as killings and extrajudicial imprisonment 2 . Nevertheless, in post-communist countries -as Adam Czarnota notes -dealing with the past concentrates mainly on the former secret police and its net of clandestine informants. This is no surprise as "its significance, pervasiveness and scale of operations were unparalleled in any other political formation known, and on some views it has bequeathed legacies of profound, if characteristically hidden, significance to the post-communist present" 3 .
Eastern European states have dealt with this situation using a number of distinctive measures, including lustration and the opening of secret service archives.
The field of transitional justice has moved beyond mere documentation or comparison of ways the affected countries deal with their past, and aims at constructing a theoretical framework which could help to articulate those issues in a synthetic manner. In line with this trend, the article presents the development of Polish lustration procedures as part of a broader, international phenomenon. Thus, after defining some basic notions connected with dealing with the past, three general models of transitional justice are described. Next, an account of Polish lustration and public disclosure measures is given with the employed instruments assigned to the models of transitional justice. Finally, the text offers concluding remarks on the evolution of Polish lustration and the actors which have shaped its course.
Basic Notions of Transitional Justice
Transitional justice is bound to a set of moral, political, legal and economic dilemmas related to a situation of regime change. Different levels at which these problems are answered provide for various understandings of the nature of transitional justice itself. Some see it as a concept of justice -either: ordinary 4 or extraordinary 5 -which governs the ethical choices connected with dealing with the past. It can also be described as a set of "political decisions made in the immediate aftermath of the transition and directed towards individuals on the basis of what they did or what was done to them under the earlier regime" 6 . Finally, transitional justice is understood as "the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses" 7 .
The measures aimed at dealing with the past include criminal trials conducted before domestic courts or international or hybrid tribunals. In cases where there is no prospect of penal sanction, truth-seeking initiatives, such as truth commissions or the opening of archives, are often implemented. Institutional reform of the public sector, including vetting of personnel, is also undertaken. The government may also wish to recognise the victims of past abuses by awarding them monetary reparation and/or by offering them symbolic acknowledgement of their suffering. Amnesties can also be seen as a transitional justice measure, especially if they are crafted carefully in order not to infringe the rule of law.
Each of these instruments can pursue its own goals, such as the establishment of individual criminal responsibility or the creation of the official memory of the past. However, Pablo de Greiff, presenting his normative conception of the goals of transitional justice, argues that these mechanisms, used in a holistic manner, can also achieve two mediate aims: recognition of victims as right-bearers and promotion of civic trust. The existence of civic trust -a joint belief that the government and fellow citizens share the same set of basic norms and therefore will not violate the rights of the individual -equates to reconciliation which, along with democracy, constitute the two final goals of transitional justice 8 .
In the authoritarian state, public institutions are often dysfunctional, corrupt and unwilling to protect human rights. During the transition, the aim of institutional reform is to transform these bodies into "institutions that support the transition, sustain peace and preserve the rule of law" and which "protect human rights, prevent abuses and impartially serve the public" 9 . The review of personnel can be a powerful tool in that process. Thus, vetting can be defined as "assessing integrity to determine suitability for public employment" whereas "integrity refers to an employee's adherence to international standards of human rights and professional conduct, including a person's financial propriety" 10 . Vetting, which concentrates on individual behaviour, should be distinguished from a purge, which can be described as massive, systematic exclusion from the public sector based on a collective guilt, such as a mere affiliation with a group like a political party 11 . The term "lustration" -which derives from the Latin word lustrum denoting "a ceremony of ritual purification"
12 -has at least three modern meanings. It can be understood as an authorized procedure "of checking candidates for some positions in the state, from the point of view of their security credential broadly conceived", as mechanisms used "to eliminate groups of people, who in the past occupied some position in the state and/or communist party apparatus" and finally as "the process of making public the names of people who consciously and secretly collaborated with the organs of the secret services" 13 . In the first meaning, lustration is similar to vetting; in the second one it is akin to decommunisation. Finally, lustration, as it is understood here, can be described as a type of vetting that concentrates both on work in the communist secret service and on clandes-tine and conscious cooperation with it. The screening can result both in the disclosure of the names of the collaborators (which is covered by the third definition presented above) and in the use of sanctions against those involved in such a collusion 14 . Apart from being a source of information used in the lustration process, the files of the communist secret service can also be subject to public disclosure. In such cases, the individuals whose names appear in the archives are not subject to vetting, as the dubious reliability of the files is not verified 15 . The disclosure can either result directly from the law which governs the control of the archives or from the work of public officials or journalists.
Models of Transitional Justice
Models transitional justice can be described as ideal types of structuring the ways in which transitional societies deal with the past. Three basic models illustrating the paradigms used by states to face the legacy of human rights violations can be identified:
• the retribution model,
• the historical clarification model,
• the thick line model. The models are based on transitional justice measures concentrating on human rights violations and their perpetrators, such as criminal trials, administrative sanctions, truthseeking and amnesties. They do not take into account instruments which concentrate on the victims, such as reparation or symbolic recognition 16 . The retribution model can be characterised as a paradigm in which the individuals whose involvement in the previous regime is condemned in a new, democratic reality are subject to sanctions. The sanctions may include criminal punishment, removal from positions in public administration, prohibition from running for certain offices or being promoted and the reduction of pensions or other benefits. The range of individuals affected may vary, yet the choice should not be arbitrary. As Diane Orentlicher notes: "the criteria used to select defendants" should "reflect appropriate distinctions based upon degrees of culpability" and therefore should be "focused on those most responsible for . In the instance of the historical clarification model, transitional justice mechanisms concentrate on the dissemination of information on society's abusive past and there exist no institutional sanctions other than the disclosure of the links of the individual to previous human rights violations. Instruments typical of this model comprise truth commissions, the creation of official remembrance institutions, the opening of archives and vetting procedures. The lack of sanctions may be incumbent on the involvement of the individual in the process of historical clarification, as was the case in South Africa 20 . In other cases, immunity to prosecution may be unconditional (Chile, until 1998 21 ). The thick line model can be described as one in which no official record of the past abuse is present and the human rights violators are not punished. Stephen A. Garrett defines it as a situation in which, as in post-Francoist Spain, "a newly emergent democracy makes a conscious decision not only to avoid prosecutions of past human rights offenders, but even to shun widespread public discussion about their having taking place in the first place" 
Polish Lustration. Historical Account and Classification
The models listed above can be used as a tool to classify Polish lustration mechanisms, as well as the instruments of public disclosure. The development of Polish lustration, discussed briefly below 24 • from 1989 to the enactment of the 1997 Lustration Act . The law dissolved the communist political police and terminated the employment of its officers. Dismissed personnel could, however, be reappointed if certain conditions were met. According to the statute and to delegated legislation, the officer had to be no older than 55, be in good physical and mental condition, have at least secondary school education and represent an "impeccable moral and patriotic attitude". Moral integrity could not be affirmed if a vetted person had a record of infringements of law, violations of dignity and rights of individuals or abuses of the post for private needs. Out of nearly 14.000 officers, over 10.000 passed the screening, yet due to downsizing of the secret service not more than 5.000 were reappointed 29 .
Because of the vetting criteria -the appraisal of the work of an individual as a secret service officer -the process can be understood as an example of lustration. Those who acquired a negative opinion from the vetting commission were subject to a sanction, as their dismissal was final and they faced no prospect of employment in the security service. Therefore, the procedure falls within the retribution model.
The 1991 elections led to the creation of a government with the issue of lustration high on its agenda. Even though the administration planned to introduce an act on vetting, no bill was proposed 30 . On the 28th May 1992, the Sejm, the lower chamber of the Polish parliament, passed a resolution which urged the Minister of Internal Affairs to submit a list of secret collaborators of the communist secret service currently holding certain public positions, including members of Parliament and higher state officials 31 . On the 4th of June, the list -which mentioned many members of Parliament and the President -was presented to the Sejm and other State institutions. Both the Minister and the Prime Minister claimed at that time that the document was not a verified list of agents but rather a set of names which appear in the archives and which should be subject to . This being the case, the creation of the list does not meet the definition of lustration. However, it can be regarded as a means of public disclosure of the secret files, which falls within the historical clarification model. This in no way should be read as an assertion of the reliability of the list, as even members of the government called for its further analysis.
The list was leaked to the media and caused uproar, which hastened the fall of the government. The resolution was later found to be unconstitutional, being contrary, inter alia, to the principles of the democratic rule of law, the protection of human dignity, the representative democratic system and the principle of legality 33 . Under the next government, six lustration bills were sent to parliament, yet none of them were finally passed. On the other hand, the 1993 Parliamentary Elections Act 34 was enacted, which forced all candidates to present a statement on their work or cooperation with the communist secret service, including military intelligence. The law was lex imperfecta, as no sanction for a lie was provided 35 . The first phase of Polish lustration included two significant developments: the 1990 Office for State Protection Act, which included instruments falling within the retribution model, and the case of the 1992 list of alleged collaborators that could be qualified as an element of historical clarification. Nevertheless, during this period there existed no lasting lustration procedure. The regulation provided in the 1993 Parliamentary Elections Act could not be regarded as one, as the lack of sanctions and verification of the declarations made it impossible to enforce the law. Thus, noting the aforesaid exceptions, the first phase of Polish lustration can nevertheless be classed under the thick line model. . Out of the five submitted bills, the joint proposal filed by the Labour Union (UP), the Freedom Union (UW) and the Polish People's Party (PSL) became the basis of the 1997 Lustration Act, which, after considerable changes, was passed on 11th April and entered into force on 3rd of August 1997.
The law provided for the vetting of the President, members of Parliament, higher public officials appointed by the President, the Prime Minister or parliamentary bodies, prosecutors, judges, chief officers in ministries and central or regional offices, and major figures in the public media, provided they were all born no later than 10th of May 1972. The lustration was also compulsory for candidates for these posts. A total of 22.000 citizens were covered by the act 37 . Each of the vetted had to issue a statement on their work, service or cooperation with the communist state security authorities, the list of which was included in the statute. Statements pleading cooperation were to be published. Cooperation was defined as both conscious and secret. In 1998, the Constitutional Court stated that the individual must have provided the secret service, which was acting within its operational duties, with actual information. The mere declaration of cooperationwith no later factual collusion -was not enough to amount to collaboration 38 . The most important feature of the Lustration Act was the fact that service or cooperation with the communist state security authorities was not in fact penalised. What was being punished was the lustration lie: a deliberate submission of a statement that was also objectively false 39 . As possible punishment was provided for the present conduct of an individual, the law could not therefore be regarded as retroactive, which was crucial considering the penal character of the legislation 40 .
The lustration was based on a criminal process and all the basic procedural guarantees were provided by the law. The final and binding verdict which found the statement to be false was to be published. The ruling was to result in the loss of a parliamentary seat, a ban on running for presidential elections or in an officially proclaimed loss of moral integrity required for certain posts and professions. The effects of the verdict were to last for 10 years from the day it became final.
As the creation of a special lustration court was unsuccessful, the law was amended in 1998. The statute 41 moved the procedure to the Warsaw Appellate Court. The act widened the scope of the vetted and covered defense counsels and officials appointed by the Speaker of the Sejm or the Senate. The lustration lie was to result in an ex lege dismissal from a post or profession; only judges had to be discharged by the verdict of a disciplinary court.
The mechanism introduced by the 1997 Lustration Act falls within the historical clarification model. Even though the law provided for a sanction, the vetted, in principle, may have felt unthreatened by it, given that they were contributing to the historical account with their true statements. Thus, Polish lustration seems to share similarities with the South African measures, as in both cases the sanction was imposed not for past misconduct but for present lack of cooperation with the process of historical clarification. In 1998, two verdicts of the Constitutional Court upheld the 1997 Lustration Act, quashing only its minor provisions 42 . In 2002, the Parliament enacted an amendment which included significant procedural changes and involved a redefinition of cooperation 43 . The redefinition was struck down by the Constitutional Court on procedural grounds. The Court also found the termination of court proceedings due to the resignation of the vetted from office to be in violation of the equality principle, as it enabled unfair calculation of the result of process 44 . In September of the same year, the Parliament again redefined cooperation, requiring it to be factual -which implemented previous court interpretations -and without connection to intelligence, counterintelligence and border protection. The second condition was quashed in 2003 by the Constitutional Court as contrary, inter alia, to the equality principle and the citizen's right to information 45 . The Court also found the lack of information on the length and the character of service or cooperation in published court verdicts to be a violation of equality and the right of an individual's good name to be protected 46 . In 1999, the Polish Bar Council issued a resolution, in which it claimed past cooperation with the communist secret service to be contrary to the basic norms governing professional conduct and called upon ex-collaborators to resign from the Bar. It also announced that it would take all legally eligible steps in order to remove them from the association and urged local bar councils to do the same 47 . The resolution -which, due to its corporate character, could not be controlled by the Constitutional Court -was enforced by the bodies of the association. The attorneys who admitted to having cooperated with the communist state security authorities, were often subject to removal from the bar. Thus, the factual lustration mechanism was closer to the retribution model, as the counsels could be dismissed on the basis of their pasts and despite their truthful declarations.
In 1998, the Parliament enacted the Institute of National Remembrance Act
48
, which regulated access to the archives of the communist secret service. The victims, who were subject to data gathering and who did not cooperate with the secret service, had the right to access their files and to ask the Institute for their rectification or anonymisation; the names of people who informed on them were also available. The officers and collabora- tors, provided they admitted their actions, gained access to the files connected to them. The archives were also open for scientific research. The statute created the possibility of a disclosure of the past and can therefore be qualified as falling within the historical qualification model.
In 2005, the Constitutional Court ruled that the restriction of the right to access and rectification of files only to the victims violated the constitutional right to the control of information on individuals gathered in public registers. In its verdict the Court ruled that access to files for groups other than victims can be achieved with a direct use of constitutional provisions. Thus, the ruling gave universal access to the secret service archives 49 . The second phase of Polish lustration was marked by the existence of an ongoing lustration procedure. Its provisions fell within the historical clarification model, with the exception of the lustration of attorneys, which was closer to the retribution model. The public disclosure of the files was introduced in 1998 and became universal in 2005. The statute replaced the previous lustration mechanism with a new procedure, which encumbered the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) with an obligation to issue personal certificates, consisting of information gathered in the archives of the communist secret service. As the information would not be verified, the measure should be regarded as an instrument of public disclosure, rather than lustration. This radical change never entered into force, as the Lustration Act was completely amended on the 14th of February 2007.
The 2007 Amendment of the 2006 Lustration Act marked a return to the previous procedure, focused on an appraisal of the validity of lustration statements. However, the law drastically widened the scope of the vetted and also included, inter alia, members of local government, all legal professions, diplomats, important posts in state organisations, certain positions in private and public media, schools and universities, and chief positions in banks and public companies. An estimated 350-400.000 people were to be covered by the act 50 . Statements also had to be presented by citizens who had been verified under the previous legislation and a failure to do so was to lead to their dismissal. The law provided for the creation of an online register of lustration declarations. The lustration proceedings were to begin with a motion by the IPN prosecutor. The final and binding verdict which found the statement to be false caused immediate dismissal from a post and a 10 year prohibition from appointment for public positions and the right to be elected. The law provided universal access to the files of people holding certain public positions. It also confirmed a general right to access one's own file, with the exception of officers and collaborators in regard to the documents they created. The IPN was also to create online registers of victims of communist surveillance, important communist politicians, secret service officers, employees and soldiers, and, finally, of secret collaborators, people who agreed to collude or those who were treated as co-operators.
In its landmark 2007 verdict, the Constitutional Court declared a large part of the 2006 Lustration Act to be unconstitutional. The Court set the limits on the lustration procedure, stating that the scope of vetting cannot include positions with no connection to the public sphere. Thus, it struck down provisions on the lustration of the private sector, including private schools, universities and media. Apart from quashing several other procedural provisions, the Court also stated that a fixed punishment for failure to submit a declaration or for presenting a false one -which, in the case of some professions, reduced the role of disciplinary courts to a mere reiteration of the previous verdict -violated the principle of proportionality and the principle of decent legislation. The online register of statements was said to violate the right to privacy and the limits on the data collected on individuals. The Court found that the catalogue of collaborators infringed the presumption of innocence; the creation of other registers was upheld, given that members of the ruling parties who later joined the opposition were not barred from being treated as victims. As a result of the verdict, the lustration process was halted and the declarations submitted had to be returned to the vetted 51 . The verdict was implemented in the amendment enacted in September 2007 52 .However, the law reintroduced fixed sanctions for a lack of declaration or a false one. With regards to the latter, the provision was again quashed in 2011 53 . In 2007, The Institute of National Remembrance Act was amended again 54 . The statute, inter alia, gave full right of access to files concerning an individual, removing the exception of former officers and collaborators of the communist secret police. In principle, the files were to be presented with no anonymisation.
During the third phase of Polish lustration, the case of the 2006 Lustration Act allowed the Constitutional Court to set the limits on the existing lustration procedure. What is more, a new mechanism for the creation of an online register of former secret service officers was also introduced. As the catalogue was to be created "on the basis of the official documents", such as "open engagements, employment contracts or other similar documents which certified unambiguous situations, easy to demonstrate or prove using official data" 55 , the author argues that the register was to be based on individually verified information -and thus is a method of lustration. According to article 20 section 5 of the 2006 Lustration Act, an entry in the IPN register can be questioned using a general lustration procedure 56 and thus the new mechanism seems to be secondary and subjected to the main process of lustration. Therefore, since 2007, apart from the instruments of public disclosure, Poland applies two alternative lustration mechanisms, both falling within the historical clarification model.
Polish Lustration. Concluding Remarks
The analysis of the historical account of Polish mechanisms of lustration and public disclosure allows for some general remarks on their evolution and the actors involved in their development.
In Poland, the legacy of the communist secret service was countered with a wide variety of lustration and public disclosure mechanisms. In the first phase of their development, there existed no general response to the problem and a number of limited and partial reactions appeared. The experience from this period resulted in the creation of a general vetting procedure in the 1997 Lustration Act and a mechanism of public disclosure in the 1998 Institute of National Remembrance Act. Both mechanisms were tied into the 2006 Lustration Act, which also created a secondary lustration process: the publication of the register of secret service officers.
Some tendencies in the development of the lustration process are easily recognisable. First, the expansion of the scope of vetting is visible. The tendency was slow in the second phase, culminating in the 2006 Lustration Act and was only stopped by the 2007 Constitutional Court Verdict. Secondly, unlike in some other countries, in Poland the lawmakers seem to understand the main lustration procedure as a criminal measure, which results in the use of the rules of a criminal process and emphasis on the nonretroactivity of the lustration lie mechanism. On the other hand, no similar concerns are present in the case of the register of secret service officers, which is created by an administrative body in an informal vetting procedure concentrating on the past conduct of the individual. Whereas due process principles are generally followed in court lustration proceedings, during the creation of the register the alleged secret service officers cannot take action and question the result of the vetting through the main lustration procedure. When it comes to public disclosure of the archives of the secret service, the process was characterised by a growing number of people being eligible to access the files and a growth in the amount of data available to them.
Polish lustration is a result of the cooperation and struggles of the Parliament and the Constitutional Court. The role of the Parliament was heavily influenced by the thencurrent political situation, as was visible in the case of the enactment of the 1997 Lustration Act. The Constitutional Court, on the other hand, created limits in the form of substantive requirements for the procedural provisions of the law, which resulted in a unique acquis constitutionnel. One should also note that both the Constitutional and the Supreme Court played essential roles in the interpretation of some of the most important parts of the acts, including the definition of cooperation. Their verdicts were often the basis of the new legislative provisions.
The input of civic society was also important. The resolution of the Polish Bar Council changing the lustration model in regard to attorneys and the role of the media -although outside the scope of this article -was also significant.
Both of the presented lustration procedures can be regarded as instruments of historical clarification. On the other hand, due to the doubtful accuracy of the files, their public disclosure can be understood only as a supplementary source of such knowledge. However, it is difficult to assess what influences the general public more: slow but steady lustration procedures or spectacular excerpts form the archives available in the everyday press.
SUMMARY Polish lustration and the models of transitional justice
Transitional justice in the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe concentrates on the problem of the lustration of former secret service officers and their clandestine collaborators and on the question of access to files created by the communist political police. The aim of the article is to present the Polish experience in this field in view of the theoretical framework available in transitional justice literature. Thus, the text begins with definitions of some basic notions connected with dealing with the past. The article also proposes three basic models of transitional justice. The third part offers an account of Polish lustration and public disclosure measures and assigns those instruments to the models of transitional justice. The final section presents some concluding remarks on the evolution of Polish lustration.
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